Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) reported in Southern Israel in Hamas terrorist attacks on 7 October, which was designed to read most of Israel. In the report released last week, the conclusions were not completely new, but they added another layer after a few weeks in which 30 hostages were alive, but came home in 8 more coffins.
And while the first phase of the ceasefire and hostage release deal is over, the next phase is not clear. Fifty-nine kidnapped soldiers and citizens live in hostage Gaza, of which 24 are considered alive.
Following the publication of the report, Israel’s mainstream Daily Yedioth Ahronoth ran the title “The Blindness, The Felure, The Question”. The headline in Israel Hyum, a right -wing free daily, what “a defeat, year,” referring to one of the major findings of the report: that Israel’s intelligence community underestimated Hamas for humans.
In 2007, the Islamist terrorist group controlled Gaza with the Palestinian Authority. In response, Israel further tightened its control over air, land and sea borders, which controls the movement of people and goods inside and out of the enclave. Both Israel and Hamas have fought many wars in recent years.
IDF failure ‘left deep mark’
On October 7, 2023, Hamas -led terrorist attacked South Israel extensively, killing 1,200 people and taking another 251 hostage according to Israeli data. According to Gaza’s Health Ministry, there was a part of 15 months in the attack with more than 48,000 Palestinians kill bees, and many small areas were surprised to the ground.
For some, the latest comprehensive reports about the work of different army branches come very late; For others, it is a little new to report. For many Israeli, IDF’s failure to protect its citizens has left deep marks. In recent months, the army has provided a resident of several kibtzim near Gaza with a minute-by-minute report of events in its communities.
“The importance of the report is the first and foremost to the survivors, the families of soldiers and citizens who were killed, the people who were kidnapped and whose families were kidnapped and [southern] The community, which are still not returned, said the Institute for National Security Studies (Inss) and a former Casset Member researcher, Shehlah.
“I think it was imported to re -establish confidence between those communities, the Israeli public and the army, that the army faces the remaining people, and they tell them what happened, and it was clear about it,” Shehlah told DW.
However, he said that many questions remain from why things happened, the way they had done within the army and its various branches, and in relation to political thinking. It was echoed by Tamir Heman, director of the INS and the former head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence.
Heman on Saturday told a panel at Meet the Press of Channel 12, “In every military investigation, three questions need to be answered: what happened, why happy, and how to improve.” “Thesis inquiry gives us a lot of information about what is happy, but still a question – why it happened – that I have not received the answer.”
Misunderstanding about humas
The investigation concluded that Hamas’s assessment was not challenged over the years and that there is no discussion on the question “What will happen if we are wrong?”
Writing for Amos Harel, writing in The Daily Hatez, “At the forefront of Intelligence Community, IDF and Shin Bet Security Service, it was not believed that Humas was able to increase the coordinated attack of thousands of terrorists in more 100 crossing points, which was responsible for successfully removing the woilds gaza division and what was responsible for what was responsible for the Division. Control the part.
The investigation therefore criticized the fact that intelligence and political leaders opted for the policy of “struggle management” towards Hamas and wrong evaluation of its abilities and intentions.
“Gaza was presented as a ‘secondary danger’ compared to Hizbullah and Iran,” Yosi Yashushua, the newspaper, wrote about military matters for Yediat Ahronoth. “Entry Israeli Leadership – From the government to intelligence branches – became accustomed to intelligence produced by advanced and sophisticated technology, which continuously create decency and ego among people watching on their shoulders. ‘Cyber’ shouted and slept, while Hamas was preparing a medieval style attack.
Long -term attack in making
The report found that, based on the documents found in Gaza and interrogation of the senior Hamas terrorist occupation during the war, the group began a discussion on a large -scale attack after the 2014 was between Israel and Hamas.
The plan, later known as “Jericho Wall”, was mainly developed by Yahya Sinavar, which was considered one of the prominent planners of October 7, after Hamas became head in Gaza in 2017. This included a surprising attack on Gaza of the diver IDF around Gaza. To take strips and hostages. According to the investigation, Hamas considered the attack for the attack in early May 2021, when Israel and Hamas Fuke Gaza were 11-days. The report said that at that time, the Israeli was unaware of the military intelligence scheme.
The report suggests that May 2021 was, so in Israel is known as “Wall’s Operation Guardian”, which is a twist point. The IDF publicly concluded at that time that Hamas had given a serious blow to the beat, along with a large part of its tunnel system – the “metro” was destroyed by the army – was destroyed, and what the underground Israel had created, reduced the least infiltration. The Israeli leaders appeared to be assuming that Hamas wanted to focus on economic development and kept calm above everyone.
But the report states that, in fact, Hamas was encouraged by the 2021 war results as it managed to get support in the region – which included disturbance in “mixed cities” in Israel – without starting a major ground operation of IDF.
The report made a fresh call to the State Inquiry Commission to investigate the role of Israeli’s political leadership. “The people of Israel cannot do the same that politicians pay a price, and that is why they want the commission of investigation,” said Offer Shelah.
An opinion poll published on Friday asked Response whether the military inquiry was sufficient, or whether there should be a state or political inquiry commission. Only 6% said that he was sufficient military inquiry, while 58% said they wanted to see a State Inquiry Commission.
While the Chief of Staff Herzy Halevi of the IDF has resigned on the failures of October 7 and will quit his post on Wednesday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not accepted the responsibility and has stopped the entire investigation repeatedly till the war.
Edited by Ben Knight
