Jameson Lopp, Christian Papathananosiou and other developers have proposed a soft fork for Bitcoin with the bip entitled “Post Quantum Migration and Legacy Signature Sunset.”
This protocol raises the introduction of directions resistant to quantum computing to protect funds against possible attacks of quantum computers capable of breaking ECDSA signatures. The proposal, Published in GithubAt the same time, it aspires that users manually and mightly migrate their bitcoins to a new management format to make the old ones obsolete.
The BIP addresses the vulnerability of the signs of elliptical curve (ECDSA) before quantum algorithms such as Shor’s, which could derive private keys from public keys exposed on the network.
To counteract it, the authors propose mandatory migration to addresses based on post-chantic algorithms, together with a period of grace to execute it. The proposal “converts quantum security into a private incentive: if it is not updated, it will surely lose access to its funds, creating a certainty where it did not exist before,” the authors comment in the repository.
The soft fork would introduce a new option in the Bitcoin script to support these post quantum firms, aspiring that users transfer their bitcoins from Legacy addresses (P2PKH or P2SH) to the newa manual process that requires updates in purses and services.
The proposal includes a mechanism of “Sunset”(Extinction) and recovery (through zero knowledge tests, although this is optional) for non -migrated funds, that would be unusable in the previous accounts after a termwhich would not stop generating controversies in the community.
By “killing” the old directions based on P2PKH or P2SH, the Bitcoin protocol would have an attachable surface due to the most limited quantum computing, the authors comment.
Phases of the gentle bifurcation of Bitcoin
According to the proposal, this soft fork would occur in three phases:
Phase A: “Prohibits sending funds to addresses with quantum vulnerability, which accelerates the adoption of the types of P2QRH addresses.”
Phase B: «Invalizes the expenses of ECDSA/Schnorr, preventing the use of funds in Utxo with quantum vulnerability. This is activated by a very publicized alert day, approximately five years after activation ».
Phase C (optional): «Waiting for greater research and demand, an independent BIP proposes a method to allow the quantum recovery of utxo inherited, possibly by the ZK possession test of a corresponding BIP-39 seed phrase.»
The motivation after the proposal is justified by the following fact: approximately, 25% of all bitcoins have revealed a public chain key. While they do not reveal where they extracted that data, the authors comment in the same way that the vulnerable UTXOs could be stolen with sufficient quantum power.
What will motivate a quantum attacker against Bitcoin?
Jameson Lopp and company They also deepened the possible motivations of an attacker with access to a sufficient amount of logical qubits that may violate the algorithm of Bitcoin elliptical curves.
Even if Bitcoin is not the main initial objective of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer, the generalized knowledge that this computer exists and is able to decipher Bitcoin cryptography will damage confidence in the network. An attack on Bitcoin may not have economic motivations; An attacker can have political or malicious motivations and try to destroy the value and confidence in Bitcoin instead of extracting value. There is no way of knowing in advance how, when or why an attack can happen. It is necessary to adopt a defensive posture well in advance of any attack.
Post quantum migration and legacy signature sunset.
As Cryptonotics reported, quantum computing is not a “biomarker” that safely indicates the death of the Bitcoin Network. It may be the case that, contrary to what you think, This technology comes to your aid.
For Jameson LOPP and the rest of the authors, this soft bifurcation would imply a significant technical effort, as it includes modifications in the protocol to generate and verify post-quantic signatures, as well as exhaustive tests to guarantee the stability of the network. They also highlight the need for community coordination to achieve consensus, a historically complex process in Bitcoin.
Although quantum threat is still theoretical, advances in quantum processors justify preparation. The proposal does not set a schedule, but underlines the importance of acting in advance.
The Bitcoin community must discuss the BIP, evaluating its viability and balance between security and complexity. LOPP, Papathananiou, Smith, Ross, Vaile and Dallaire-Demers thus open an interesting technical debate about the future of Bitcoin’s security.
