Ethiopia and Eritrea have experienced some important moments in their shared history: Following the end of the colonial era, Eritrea was incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire. The independence struggle ended with the secession of the former province in 1993. Since then, there have been two more wars, in which vast landlocked Ethiopia and its smaller neighbor on the Red Sea faced each other, first as rivals and later as allies.
Now, relations have again become so strained that many residents of the border area live in constant fear of another war.
“The risk of conflict between the two countries remains very high,” said Michael Woldemariam, an associate professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy.
“We can say with some confidence that the tension and hostility between the two governments has become more pronounced over the past few months and weeks,” Woldemariam told DW.
What are the causes of current stress?
The governments of both the countries were allies for a short time till three years ago. They had joined forces against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia’s northern province of Tigray. Depending on the source, between 162,000 and 600,000 people died in this extremely brutal war.
The TPLF is also the common denominator in the past sympathies between the two countries: although its ethnic group constituted only 6% of the Ethiopian population, the TPLF dominated domestic politics for decades and implemented a harsh policy against Eritrea. The TPLF’s dominance ended in 2018 when Abiy Ahmed, who comes from the Oromo and Amhara, the two largest ethnic groups, was elected. Elected Ethiopian Prime Minister. Abiy pushes for rapprochement with Eritrea; He was later selected for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019.
But relations that had improved since the end of the Tigray war are now in shambles. The main point of contention is Abiy’s increasingly vigorous demand for a port for Ethiopia, the world’s most populous landlocked country with 120 million inhabitants. Ethiopia mainly uses ports in its smaller neighbor Djibouti for imports and exports – and, according to experts, pays between $1.5 billion and $2 billion (€1.3 billion and €1.7 billion) annually to do so. Abiy argues that these costs hinder economic growth.
Eritrea fears Abiy could forcefully take over the port of Assab, just 75 kilometers across the border. In mid-October, high-ranking Ethiopian officials, intelligence and military representatives visited the border town of Bure, located on the highway to Assab. Bure saw fierce fighting during the war between 1998 and 2000 and the meeting fueled concerns of renewed fighting.
Unlike Abiy’s government and the TPLF, Eritrea was not a party to the 2022 Tigray peace agreement in Pretoria. After the deal was closed, powerful TPLF officials clashed over the concessions given to Abiy, ultimately leading to divisions within the TPLF. A breakaway faction distanced itself from the Prime Minister and reportedly received support from Eritrea. Since the spring, there have been numerous reports of clashes and army movements in northern Ethiopia. When Ethiopia recently accused Eritrea of supporting local militias, Asmara dismissed the claim as “false drama.”
Ethiopia’s army stretched due to internal conflicts
The Ethiopian army is currently fighting rebels in many parts of the country. Abdurrahman Saeed, a Britain-based expert on the Horn of Africa, said he doubts Ethiopian forces are currently in a position to capture the port of Assab.
“At the moment, the fighting in the Amhara region has proven very challenging for the Ethiopian army. So under these circumstances, I think it would not be a wise move to go to war against Eritrea,” he told DW.
This argument has also been given by Bayisa Wak-Woya, a former United Nations diplomat of Ethiopian origin.
“Theoretically, anything can happen, but personally, I don’t think there will be any direct war between Ethiopia and Eritrea beyond the ongoing verbal war for several reasons,” Wak-Woya told DW. “I really don’t think there is any basis at this stage for Ethiopia and Eritrea to go to full-scale war.”
Speaking before the Ethiopian parliament in late October, Abiy reaffirmed Ethiopia’s “irreversible demand” for its access to the sea.
“I am convinced a million times that Ethiopia will no longer be a landlocked country,” he said.
A military takeover of Assab would be a violation of international law, Wak-Woya said.
“If Ethiopia does this against Eritrea just to get access to Assab, it is illegal,” he said.
However, Abiy also told lawmakers that it was not his intention to renew the conflict.
“We have no intention of waging war (with Eritrea, ed.), but we firmly believe that this issue can be resolved peacefully,” he said during his address to parliament.
Abiy Ahmed wants mediation, but who will be involved?
He said he had already discussed his desire for the Ethiopian port with the United States, Russia, China, the African Union and the European Union.
Security expert Saeed argued that the African Union would be the right place for conflict resolution, but added: “The African Union has always had a chronic problem when it comes to addressing conflict issues within Africa, but also within Ethiopia. In 2024, when the Prime Minister of Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland, a rebel region of the Republic of Somalia, it was a clear violation of the African Union Charter, which “Calls to respect the boundaries inherited from colonialism.”
Woldemariam, a US-based researcher, said he believed the Trump administration could pressure both sides to make concessions because both Ethiopia and Eritrea are interested in improving relations with Washington.
“On the other hand, of course, I think it depends on the countries in the Horn region to see what’s actually happening in Washington. I think the Trump administration is considered a somewhat unpredictable actor at the present time, not necessarily trustworthy,” Woldemariam said.
Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has already asked for support from his ally Egypt: in late October, he traveled to Cairo for a five-day working visit. Egypt is already at odds with Ethiopia over the GERD dam on the Nile River.
Said emphasized Egypt’s strong domestic interests in settling the conflict.
“The Red Sea is as important to the Egyptians as the Nile River because of the income they get from the Suez Canal. If there is a problem at the southern entrance to the Red Sea at Bab el-Mandab, their income will be affected,” Saeed said.
When Yemeni Houthi rebels shelled international cargo ships in the region as a show of support for Palestinians in Gaza, revenues temporarily dropped by 40%.
What role do Ethiopia’s upcoming elections play?
Abiy’s current term is ending as Ethiopians head to the polls some time in 2026. Observers are offering differing opinions on how much the impending elections could affect rising tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Bayisa Wak-Woya believes Abiy can hope to win re-election – and a new term will give him plenty of time to address the port issue.
“I think the issue of Assab will never disappear from the political arena of the government and even most opposition groups, because, first of all, there are many people, not least the current generation, but my generation and so on, we still cannot assimilate the fact that Eritrea is no longer part of Ethiopia,” the former UN diplomat told DW.
Edited by Shawn Sinico