Ahead of the expected formal signing of the Iran-US Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Friday, Iran’s political environment has clearly become more tense.
Hardline factions that remained relatively quiet during most of the war are now waging a vigorous campaign against the leaked terms of the agreement, which have not been fully made public, and accusing the negotiating team of backsliding and betrayal.
Reaction is no longer limited to speeches and headlines. This has spilled over into the streets, where groups of regime supporters have held protest rallies.
Hardliners are demanding a halt to talks with the US as they fear the deal would reshape both Iran’s foreign policy and internal balance of power.
There were reports that dozens of people protested outside the Foreign Ministry office in the city of Mashhad, with similar radical anger seen in Tehran.
Protesters in Tehran’s Ibn Sina Square chanted slogans demanding the resignation of Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who is seen as the lead negotiator with the US, according to video and images broadcast by domestic outlets and other published accounts.
Some protesters also reportedly raised slogans of violence against Arakchi and Ghalibaf.
Political opposition to talks with America in Iran
Criticism from hard-liners in Iran’s parliament has fueled street protests.
Mahmoud Nabavian, deputy head of parliament’s national security committee and close to the Pedari Front, a small, ultra-Orthodox party, has publicly attacked several parts of the MOU.
Nabavian has reportedly objected to the lack of meaningful Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz and the vagueness of any commitment on US military withdrawal from the area.
This criticism fits a broader pattern visible in recent media coverage that hardliners see the MOU as leaving too much unresolved, while turning the wartime narrative of leverage and defiance into a peacetime narrative of the agreement.
Why do fundamentalists feel threatened?
Babak Dorbeki, a London-based political analyst and former official at Iran’s Strategic Research Center, told DW that the reaction was more than a disagreement over diplomatic terms.
As he said, “For the Pedari camp, this is no longer a tactical issue. It has become an existential issue.”
Dörbacki argues that a negotiated political environment does not benefit extremists who encourage confrontation.
If regime legitimacy begins to shift from ideological confrontation to state pragmatism, economic management and diplomacy, political currents built around permanent mobilization and securitization risk losing their relevance.
If Iran opens up more during negotiations with the US, it could strengthen the pragmatists, diplomats and technocrats inside the system, while weakening those whose politics depend on slogans, pressure and a permanently closed political environment.
What impact will fundamentalists have on the talks?
Analyst Dorbachy does not dismiss the potential for radicals to cause trouble. He noted that they still have influence on media platforms, parliamentary allies, networks inside state institutions, and parts of the Basij and other ideological structures.
However, he believes there are limits to his power.
Although they can complicate deal implementation, increase political costs and create noise around every agreement, they are probably not strong enough to derail the entire process.
More likely, in their reading, they will eventually adapt by claiming that any progress following US negotiations is the result of years of “resistance,” or, conversely, will be able to blame ultimate policy failures on the agreement and the officials who supported it.
Radicals are only a part of the regime
Reza Alijani, a Paris-based political analyst, told DW that hard-liners should not be mistaken for the entire regime.
“Even within the minority class, there are fundamentalist minorities who rule over the majority section of the society,” he said.
Alijani argues that they do not have decisive influence at the top, even though they can still exert pressure from below.
In his view, the real division inside the Islamic Republic is now between those who are gradually moving from ideology to state interest, and those who are still committed to maximalist slogans and wartime rhetoric.
The analyst said he expects Iranian authorities will allow radicals to hold outcries and limited rallies, and then control them once the leadership’s preferred line is determined. If negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program progress as expected, it could signal another shift from ideological rigidity toward selective pragmatism. This does not mean that the regime is becoming liberal. But this means that some of its most uncompromising facts may find themselves increasingly sidelined.
Alijani believes that with this in mind, the protests are an attempt by hard-liners to show that they still matter, that they can still bring people to the streets and that any moves toward accommodation with Washington will come at a domestic political cost.
Edited by: Wesley Rahn