When the United States and Israel launched war on Iran in late February, they hoped to paralyze both the Islamic Republic and its so-called “axis of resistance” in the Middle East. This includes Iran’s paramilitary proxy groups, including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Iraq, all of which are hostile to the US and Israel.
The assumption was that “by attacking the right leaders, weapons facilities, and supply lines, an external actor could induce a catastrophic failure in the networks of the Iranian regime and its Middle Eastern allies,” said Peter Salisbury, a fellow at the American think tank Century International and lead author of the think tank’s recently published study. report“Beyond the axis.”
Despite achieving several US and Israeli military objectives, Iranian forces were able to continue drone attacks on neighboring Gulf countries and shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, while their allies in Lebanon and Yemen stepped up attacks against Israel and commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
operational autonomy
For Wolf-Christian Pais, associate fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and one of the contributors to the “Beyond the Axis” report, the term “proxy” is actually misleading because it implies a command-and-control relationship between Tehran and members of the Axis.
“unmanned aerial vehicle [UAV] “Proliferation is a good example,” he told DW. A few years ago, Tehran transferred the entire system and necessary training to its allies. “Today these militias can build their own UAVs based on Iranian designs, the vast majority of parts coming from countries other than Iran,” Pace said.
For example, according to the report, which was published after two years of research, these groups are able to obtain large quantities of engines for the Shaheed-136 drone directly from Chinese manufacturers.
“Dual-use technology is difficult to control in the first place and without a traditional hub for smuggling, tracking the supply chain is like finding a needle in a haystack,” Pace told DW. He said that for example China, Russia but also Oman have not made any real efforts to control the movement of these goods so far.
According to the “Beyond the Axis” report, drone-related conflict incidents worldwide are projected to increase from 140 in 2016 to more than 58,000 in 2025, an increase of 41,000%.
relationships are changing
“The increasing ability of Iran’s partners to independently manufacture and deploy drones is also changing the nature of their relationship with Tehran,” Neil Quilliam, associate fellow in the Middle East and North Africa program at the UK-based think tank Chatham House, told DW.
In his view, the Houthi militia in Yemen reflects this trend. The group now has a level of operational autonomy that would have been difficult to imagine a decade ago. “Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah helped establish the foundation of the Houthis’ drone and missile programs, while years of conflict and isolation forced them to develop domestic production capabilities,” he told DW.
During the two-year war in Gaza from 2023 to 2025, the Houthis attacked Israel as well as international shipping in the Red Sea with drones and missiles in what they said was an effort to show support for Palestinians in Gaza. During the war in Iran from February to April 2026, the Houthis resumed attacks.
The report also said that, since at least 2022, a small group of senior Houthi officials in Sanaa have built up ties to the African coasts of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. “Houthi smuggling networks are now present in Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan,” the report said.
Lebanese Hezbollah militia
For many years, Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia was Tehran’s best-equipped proxy, largely due to its proximity to Israel. On October 7, 2023, a day after Hamas attacked Israel, Hezbollah opened a second front north of Israel that escalated into the war in Lebanon.
Quilliam said, “Israeli efforts to degrade the organization’s leadership and military infrastructure created a situation in which Iranian assistance became necessary for reform.”
The November 2024 ceasefire broke down in early March 2026, when Hezbollah attacked Israel with drones and missiles following the Israeli assassination of Iranian leader Ali Khamenei, to whom Hezbollah had also pledged allegiance. The front in Lebanon has become a major issue in peace talks between the US and Tehran.
Quilliam said, “Hezbollah’s involvement with Iran during the recent conflict, coupled with Tehran’s insistence that any ceasefire arrangement include Lebanon, shows how closely linked the two are.”
Hamas in Gaza, paramilitary groups in Iraq
As a result of Israel’s long military campaign in Gaza, Tehran’s access to Gaza and Hamas has diminished, Quilliam said. “This should not be seen as a permanent decline in Iranian relevance, as the relationships, training networks and technical expertise developed over decades have not disappeared,” he told DW. In his view, Tehran’s relationship with Hamas shows how military cooperation can survive even when political influence temporarily diminishes.
Quilliam said that in Iraq, armed groups linked to Tehran need to balance local Iraqi interests against their ties to Iran. While greater drone self-sufficiency gives them more independent means of projecting power and exerting influence, “the challenge for Tehran lies in coordinating a growing number of capable actors whose interests only partially overlap,” Quilliam said.
In his view, Iran maintains influence in all of these groups through political ties, training, intelligence sharing, and strategic coordination. “But the effect is not the same as control,” he told DW.
‘New kind of challenge’
Century International’s Salisbury agrees that Iran is still the most powerful and productive node of militia groups, but the relationship between Tehran and proxies has turned into mutual dependence. “Capabilities, data and strategic needs flow in many directions,” he said.
Does all this make it harder for Iran’s adversaries to destroy these networks and reduce the threat of drone warfare from them?
“Looking ahead, the most important consequence of drone proliferation in the so-called ‘axis of resistance’ may be the emergence of multiple centers of expertise in what was once viewed as a primarily Iranian-led system,” Quilliam told DW. “This makes the broader network more resilient, harder to disrupt, and potentially more unpredictable.”