China on Tuesday accused US President Donald Trump of “pouring oil” over the struggle, as Israel-Iran fought for the fifth straight day.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun said in Beijing, “Danger and mountain pressure will not help promote the de-size of the situation, but it would only want to intensify and widen the conflict.”
He was referring to a social media post by Trump before leaving for the G7 summit in Canada, in which the US President wrote: “I said it again and again! Everyone should vacate Tehran!”
Guo stated that China was calling all the parties concerned – “Those countries with special impact on Israel” – to take immediate measures to calm the Tensi situation.
While the US is the strongest ally in Israel, Beijing and Tehran share close ties.
In a DW interview, William Figuero, for the International Relations Specialist, talks about how Chinese’s struggle, and talks about what the role of Beijing can play what the role can play.
DW: How do you see China’s stance on the ongoing struggle between Iran and Israel?
William Figuero: China’s response reflects its stance on the Israeli-Pilstinian conflict and the war in Gaza. Essential, China focuses on two main points: first, it is largely blamed on Israel, and second, it asks for dialogue, interaction and de-skeleton rather than constantly resorting to military action or forced diplomacy.
As the situation developed, China’s situation continued to emphasize Iran’s vengeance and the right to rescue, especially in response to Israeli attacks. Chinese goods are primarily prepared around the sovereign issue.
Can you say that China has not yet actively involved in the situation?
No, nor China sees it as an area where it can use the effect – the Chinese state media is barely covering the issue.
I believe that this situation reflects the fundamental border of China in the region. Simply put, China does not have an important role in this struggle. It lacks capacity for power projects in the region and is not a major player in traditional security sense.
China’s real competitive advantage in the Middle East lies in its economic relations and, topically, to serve as a diplomatic bridge.
However, in this specific conflict, Iran and Israel are nothing short of communication channels – they are not just ready to talk. It leaves China with very few rooms to diplomatically maneuver.
Additionally, given the relative limited risk, I do not think that China has any hunger to directly involve itself in this conflict, even if it has the ability to do so when any action bunches high cost and provides little profit.
China has been actively engaged in Middle East cases in recent years, especially Saudi-Iran reconciliation. Do you think China will try media even in Iran-Israel struggle?
I believe that China will maintain its current approach, which is to be open for regional efforts. China prefers to act as a architect for dialogues that originate from within the field. This encourages diplomatic engagement, but China does not have a equipment nor to apply pressure as diplomatic style, for example, the United States.
Say it simply: Saudi-Iran’s deal was a low-hanging fruit that China was happy to include low cost and high politics. Any participation in Iran-Israel struggle will be the opposite: very high cost and very low potential benefits. I do not believe that China has the ability or encouragement to find a role.
Given China’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil, do you think the current situation is a threat to China’s energy security?
The situation pose some risks for China’s energy security, and Chinese leaders definitely know about it. This is part of the reason that they want the conflict to be a de-assign quickly.
However, I will not tell it as a big danger.
Currently, Russia is China’s largest supplier of oil, which crosses Iran. China is so domestic oil reserve. Therefore, losing access to Iranian oil will affect the supply, it will not create a significant decrease.
Iran is 10% of China’s total oil imports. Additionally, China is a source of oil from countries such as Brazil and Saudi Arabia. I believe that Saudi Arabia is untouched by this particular struggle. If Iran had to attack Saudi Arabia or involve it significantly in the conflict, it would provoke a very strong response from the United States. The discovery of growth will be very expensive for Iran, making it an unexpected landscape.
China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil and its largest business partner. Can this economic relationship give a meaningful effect to Beijing on Iran?
Generally, no. I think it is quite clearly displayed. For example, when Iran-supported groups attacked Israeli shipping in the Red Sea, any call was made for China to use its impact on Iran to prevent moving forward. Either China chose not to work, or they were not able to work.
Original, I do not believe it is to make its economic relations weapons in China’s interest. China is unlikely to say to Iran, “If you don’t do what we want, we can cancel our deals.”
China can consider the search strategy in the situation where its main national interests are – discovery as matters related to Taiwan – but not what it considers regional or domestic issues in the Middle East.
Even if China has significant advantage on Iran, it will be very difficult to solve this particular issue. No country is going to convince Iran to leave its civil nuclear program, and China does not even support that purpose. Beijing believes that Iran has the right to civil nuclear power.
If the Iran-Israel struggle progresses, it is likely that America may be drawn more deeply in it. Can we find American complication as a strategic advantage for China?
Yes, I believe that it will generally be seen as beneficial for China. In fact, it is a frequent point created by both mainstream scholars and popular commentator in China. They often argue that America’s continuous military entangles in the Middle East give American resources, time and strategic attitude.
It is fine that many Chinese analysts for China continue to avoid similar military commitments and instead their strength – economic development, investment and initiatives like Belt and Road.
Even American politicians are arguing on the issue. Some people in the Congress argue that the US should prioritize competition with China in Pacific rather than joining the Middle East and further. From the point of view of China, further American complication in Middle Eastern conflicts will be seen strategically as beneficial.
Given China’s growing alignment with non-western powers, do you see it further in such conflicts carrying out the anti-aggressive city-western positions?
Sometimes there is a misunderstanding that China will automatically align itself on the anti-Western block against US-supported policies. In fact, while China diplomatically, and perhaps ideologically supports the Palestinian cause, when it comes to practicing the effect and the desire of incosses to move the results, China must be mostly other countries, and is willing to do it.
If the Iranian rule was collapsing, will China quietly welcome the power vacuum?
I do not think China will welcome a scenario. China usually opposed electric vacuum and chaotic infection. China has no important issue of dealing with the Islamic Republic and will really like the international community to normalize relations with Iran.
Historically, China has worked with caution in the thesis position. For example, in 1979, as Iran’s monarchy collapsed. China’s previous behavior suggests that in the event of the collapse of governance, it will adopt a waiting-and-looking approach, which prefers to work with emerging as the next stable authority.
The interview was conducted by Jinen Lee. It is edited for Langath and Clarity.
Edited by: Srinivas Majumdaru
