Iranian and US negotiators are due to meet for talks in the Pakistani capital Islamabad this weekend to try to consolidate a two-week ceasefire agreed by both sides after nearly six weeks of war.
The high-risk talks remained in limbo on Friday as Israel and Hezbollah – the Iran-backed Shiite militant group in Lebanon – continued firing.
Tehran has also not fully reopened the Strait of Hormuz, a major artery of global trade, through which a fifth of global oil and about a quarter of natural gas shipments passed before the war began.
Publicly, Iran has exercised caution in negotiations, but inside the country the picture is more complex.
On the surface, wartime conditions have created the impression of a unified regime, but in reality, there are signs of tension beneath that facade.
Some radical voices believe that Iran now has the upper hand and should move forward rather than compromise. Meanwhile, those who support a ceasefire and a lasting peace agreement risk being branded as appeasers.
The system cannot completely capture the armistice
The tension was visible in the statement issued by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council after the announcement of the temporary ceasefire.
Without naming anyone, it called on all sides to avoid sowing seeds of division, a sign that the leadership is concerned about rifts within the regime.
In the past, the office of the Supreme Leader could usually resolve such disputes, but today the picture is bleaker.
Mojtaba Khamenei, who succeeded his father as supreme leader after he was killed in an airstrike on the first day of the war, has been absent from public view, prompting speculation about his condition.
Observers say the absence of a clear mediator capable of bringing together the regime’s myriad factions risks turning strategic disagreements into an even more destabilizing situation.
Why do radicals still want war?
The most obvious risk to a ceasefire comes from those inside the regime who may view continued confrontation as more useful than agreement.
A political activist in Iran, who was previously associated with the reformist camp but now describes himself as independent, told DW that the government fears radicals could take an increasingly hardline stance and challenge the already weak state, which lacks strong organizational capacity.
He said that in recent days, authorities had distributed weapons among loyalist forces out of fear of public unrest. “They are afraid of a popular uprising,” he said, adding that “12 and 13-year-olds” could also be seen among those gathering in the streets.
Large mobilization makes compromises harder to sell domestically, where it risks being seen as capitulation rather than necessity.
Iran’s own history provides a warning. Following the Iran–Iraq War in the 1980s, those who supported ending the conflict were for years attacked as those who had prevented victory, even though then-Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini himself accepted the ceasefire and described it as drinking from a “poisoned chalice”.
The ideological reactions of the regime remain another major obstacle.
In recent days, voices from within the establishment have tried to link Israel’s continued attacks on Lebanon to a future Tehran-Washington understanding.
It is unclear whether these statements are a deliberate attempt to undermine the chances of Iran and the US reaching an agreement during upcoming talks.
The growing gap between ruling factions?
Nevertheless, there are forces within the system that appear to have strong reasons for maintaining the ceasefire.
Reza Alijani, a political activist, told DW that Pakistan played a role publicly and China behind the scenes in pushing Tehran toward the agreement.
But in his view, the real pressure came from Iran’s own borders. “The Islamic Republic still has the military capacity,” he said, “but it is unlikely to have the economic capacity for a protracted war.”
Alijani argued that that gap has widened the divide between the military wing of the regime and its political-executive wing. “This divide will influence the decision-making process and help shape the future.”
What is needed for lasting peace?
Babak Dorbeki, a former deputy for social and cultural affairs at Iran’s Center for Strategic Research, said a durable ceasefire is only possible if negotiations move beyond short-term crisis management.
“This can happen only if Islamabad talks move from ‘crisis management’ to ‘changing the structure of relations’,” he said.
He also believes that for lasting peace, Tehran must abandon its ideological confrontation, create a regional security framework and redefine its internal interests so that “the survival of the regime no longer depends on external tensions.”
But this will not prove easy as some sections of the Iranian leadership consider external confrontation useful to strengthen their domestic position, Dorbacki underlined.
Against this backdrop, the difficult effort to become a durable peace will require not only an Iran-US agreement but also engagement from all powerful players in the Islamic Republic’s governance.
Edited by: Srinivas Majumdaru
