On July 1, Vietnam’s first population law took effect, introducing a number of measures aimed at encouraging couples to have more children.
Women in the selected groups will receive a minimum childbirth subsidy of approximately €66 ($75).
Female employees giving birth to a second child are now entitled to maternity leave, up from six to seven months, while paternity leave for fathers whose wives have a second child has doubled to 10 working days.
The subsidies for prenatal and newborn screening will initially be given to select groups before being expanded nationwide in January. Families with at least two biological children may also receive priority access to social housing.
The law follows Vietnam’s decision last year to end its long-standing two-child policy. However, reversing the demographic trend will not be easy. Vietnam’s fertility rate fell to a record low of 1.91 children per woman in 2024, well below the replacement level of about 2.1.
By 2050, the share of Vietnam’s working-age population, those aged 15 to 64, is projected to fall from 68.6% to 63%. Meanwhile, the proportion of the population aged 65 and over is expected to increase from 8.4% to 21.2%, according to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.
A major concern is that Vietnam grows old before it gets rich. Per capita GDP reached about $5,000 last year, far below the levels achieved by Japan, South Korea and Singapore when they were in Vietnam’s social aging phase.
“If countries grow old before they become rich, economic growth may slow, while income inequality and pressure on health care and social support systems may increase,” Busrawan Teravichichanan, associate professor of sociology and co-director of the Center for Family and Population Research at the National University of Singapore, told DW.
“This could have a serious impact on the well-being of older adults, especially those with limited resources,” he said.
An area is aging at different speeds
Across Southeast Asia, falling fertility rates and longer life expectancies are reshaping societies, although at different rates.
In Singapore, around 2010 the number of people aged 60 and above exceeded those under 15. Thailand reached the same point in the mid-2010s. According to the United Nations, Vietnam is projected to follow around 2035.
The significant increase in the number of elderly people places additional pressure on health services and the state, which must include pension payments and other types of relief.
This is particularly worrying in Vietnam, where pension and social-insurance coverage remains unequal, especially among the country’s large informal workforce.
Thailand’s experience shows that high income levels do not eliminate these challenges. Its welfare system, healthcare sector and labor market are already struggling to keep pace with a shrinking workforce and a rapidly growing elderly population.
Aging trends vary across Southeast Asia, creating both challenges and opportunities.
Thailand has long been dependent on migrant workers from neighboring Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, where the working-age population is expected to grow or remain stable until 2050.
Migration can help ease labor shortages in sectors such as construction, agriculture, manufacturing and care work, although this also requires governments to strengthen migrant rights and access to services.
Singapore has long relied on immigration and foreign labor to support its workforce, even though migration remains politically sensitive.
In contrast, Vietnam has a much smaller immigrant population and has shown less interest in relying on large-scale inward migration in response to aging.
beyond the race of more children
However, a growing body of analysts and experts argue that governments should reconsider the negotiations. Rather than viewing aging solely as an economic problem that can be solved by increasing births, governments should focus on enabling people to live longer, healthier and more productive lives.
In Thailand and Vietnam, the policy debate largely focuses on the total fertility rate because it provides a clear and measurable target, said Wiraporn Pothisiri, associate professor at Chulalongkorn University’s College of Population Studies.
Yet, “despite these efforts, fertility continues to decline, suggesting that low fertility is driven by broader structural economic and social changes that cannot be reversed through pro-reproductive policies alone,” he told DW.
These underlying factors are the result of the rapid urbanization and industrialization observed in Southeast Asia since the early 1990s.
Pothisiri argued that a more effective approach would be to help couples achieve their desired family size while strengthening the health, productivity and resilience of the existing workforce.
They said, “Unlike higher fertility, whose economic benefits will not be realized for at least two decades, reducing preventable mortality can immediately strengthen demographic resilience by preserving the existing and future workforce, especially in countries with large avoidable mortality gaps.”
This will require investments not only in child care and family support, but also in preventive health care, flexible retirement policies, and technologies that help older people remain independent.
Teravichikanen said countries that are better prepared are those that treat aging not just as a reproductive problem, but as a social change.
He said that Singapore is a useful example. “It combined efforts to increase fertility with policies on active aging, workforce retraining, extended working life, health care planning, and differentiated immigration channels for professionals as well as middle- and low-skilled workers.”
Need for a change in mindset?
Another change in mindset will see the aging population as a sign of success.
“Everyone wants to live longer. Yes, there are challenges, but we should not forget that this is a celebration,” Aris Ananta, an economics professor at Universitas Indonesia, told DW.
Ananta said that governments should promote “active and healthy ageing”, thereby extending the period during which people remain healthy, independent and socially connected.
This includes allowing older people to work longer, reducing the pressure on the economy caused by the decline in the working-age population.
The success of this approach, Ananta said, would mean that getting “old” would no longer start at 60 or 65, but at 70, 75 or even 80.
Such a shift will not end demographic pressure, but it will redefine success, going beyond simply increasing birth rates to ensuring that longer lives are healthy, productive, and secure.
Edited by: Srinivas Majumdaru