Anger over high-level corruption and economic hardship was not at the root of Peter Magyar’s victory in Hungary’s parliamentary election last weekend.
His victory was also a repudiation of Viktor Orbán’s ‘liberal democracy’, a rejection of his move away from the European mainstream, and a warning not to get too close to Moscow’s orbit.
His two closest aides – Prime Ministers Robert Fico of Slovakia and Andrej Babiš of Czechia – moved relatively quickly to congratulate Magyar. But the congratulations were carefully worded and contained no praise.
Andrzej Babiš wrote on “They should not be disappointed,” he said.
His Slovak counterpart, Robert Fico, will not issue long video messages and lengthy press statements. However, this time, journalists received a third email with three bullet points.
“I fully respect the decision of the Hungarian voters,” Fico said. He said he was ready for “deep cooperation” with the new government in Budapest.
Slovakia’s priorities remain unchanged
Fico said Slovakia’s priorities would remain unchanged. These include reviving the Visegrad Group (an informal alliance between Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), protecting shared energy interests, and restoring Russian oil supplies to Slovakia and Hungary through the Druzhba pipeline.
Kiev has halted supplies following Russian drone and missile attacks on a section of the pipeline in Ukraine.
Now they can be reinstated: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently said repairs could begin in the next few weeks.
Central Europe faces uncertainty
The carefully calibrated responses of Bratislava and Prague reflect both the scale of the political shift in Budapest and the uncertainty now facing Central Europe, where Orbán had long been the central figure in a loose coalition of nationalist and populist leaders.
After all, Orbán co-founded the Eurosceptic Patriots for Europe group with Babis in 2024.
For Czech and Slovak leaders, the election results are not only symbolic, but potentially critical for their own political positions.
What does Orbán’s defeat mean for Fico?
“The biggest threat to Russia is a free, independent and democratic Ukraine,” said Martin Poliasik, a former Slovak lawmaker with the opposition Progressive Slovakia party.
“By extension, the biggest threat to Fico is a pro-European Hungary, because Slovaks will think it is possible,” Poliasik told DW.
Orbán’s defeat also deprived Fico of a major partner on the European stage. The Hungarian leader was seen as a key negotiator with both Moscow and Washington.
Fico now Putin’s man in Europe?
Some believe that Russia will turn its full attention to Slovakia, at least for now.
However, Poliasik expressed skepticism that Fico could step into Orbán’s place as Putin’s man in Europe.
“He’s tired,” he told DW. Unlike Orbán, Fico also lacks a strong team of capable and combative enforcers, he said.
The Slovak leader had threatened to freeze a €90 billion EU loan to Kiev if Orbán lost. Some doubt that he is really ready to challenge the rest of the EU on his own.
Will Magyar’s election bring stability?
But even with Orban out of power, analysts warn that change in Hungary may not bring long-term stability.
“I think it’s really difficult to stay in power in Europe right now,” Poliasik said. “It’s hard to maintain the status quo. It’s like a swinging pendulum.”
That instability is well understood in Prague.
Andrzej Babiš returned to power in late 2025 at the head of a coalition including his ANO movement, the conservative Motorists for Themselves party and the far-right, anti-immigrant SPD.
Critics argue that the government is already trying to reshape key elements of Czechia’s liberal democratic system, taking lessons from the Orban playbook, including the role of public media and civil society.
Supporters – as well as Babiš himself – reject that characterization.
Limits on what Babi can do in Czechia
Meanwhile, analysts say there are structural limits to what he can achieve in a Czech setting.
Czech political commentator Jindrich Sidlo said, “During his first term as prime minister Babiš realized that he could not control the country the way Orbán could.”
“Orbán ruled for too long, his election results were too different, there is no Senate [Czech upper house of parliament] In Hungary, and he was able to shape the electoral system to his advantage,” he told DW.
“This is something that Babis would have envisaged, but I think he now understands that this is not realistic in the Czech Republic. Even changing the electoral law requires agreement between the Chamber and the Senate – you can’t force it,” he said, “So, in this sense, Babis is a much weaker version of Orbán.”
What about the coalitions created by Orbán?
Beyond national politics, Orbán’s defeat could also affect the broader network of coalitions formed over the past decade.
András Lederer of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee argues that Hungary has played a central role in supporting like-minded actors across Europe.
“Orbán has helped his allies politically and economically,” he said.
That support includes funding for think tanks, advocacy groups and media initiatives aligned with a more sovereigntist vision of Europe, he told DW.
“With Orbán out of power, this network will largely shrink or disappear,” Lederer said.
Can the Visegrad Group be revived?
Its implications could also extend to regional cooperation formats such as the Visegrad Group.
The group has been largely inactive since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, exposing deep divisions among its members.
Poland and Czechia have been strong supporters of Kyiv. Hungary under Orbán and Slovakia under Fico have taken a much more hostile position.
Babis has indicated interest in reviving Visegrad, and his government has already taken steps to improve relations with Bratislava.
But without Orbán, a new Hungarian leader who wants to improve relations with Brussels, and Poland with no interest in the Visegrad format – at least until the next elections in Warsaw – the bloc appears more moribund than ever.
Edited by: Angiel Flanagan