Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in the EU’s eastern flank, the United States’ disregard for and disregard for the international order under President Donald Trump, and accusations that Israel has violated humanitarian law in the Middle East conflict have shocked many Europeans.
It seems that the world order that was created after the Second World War has come to an end. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said at the Munich Security Conference in February 2026: “This order, as imperfect as it was even in its best days, no longer exists in that form.”
However, in Asia, political observers are often surprised at the nervousness of some Europeans. “Europe thought it had the jungle under control forever. And then it got a shock,” former Singapore diplomat Bilahari Kausikan told DW during the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual Asian security conference in Singapore.
He said, “Competition and conflict are fundamental features of international relations. These enduring, hard truths were obscured for a brief period – perhaps about 20 years, from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the outbreak of the global financial crisis. This was an extraordinary phase in world history.”
America as we knew it will not return
Mark Saxer, Asia Pacific head of Germany’s Friedrich Ebert Foundation, told DW that European and Asian worldviews are shaped by different historical experiences. Under the protective umbrella of the United States, Europe was able to dream of a liberal world order. This was unimaginable for Asia.
Saxer views efforts to maintain the liberal world order as failing, and believes that “a return to the role the US played until 2010 is impossible for structural reasons.”
The political analyst said the unipolar era is definitely over, as the US has strategically overextended itself with conflict zones in Europe, the Middle East and Asia-Pacific.
Thomas Klein-Brockhoff, director of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), told DW that the US under Trump is now attempting to establish “a hegemonic world of great powers, a kind of global directorate with Russia and China, equivalent to spheres of influence controlled by the great powers.”
As a result, international law and multilateral institutions such as the United Nations are being undermined by the United States, China, and Russia (each for their own reasons and with their own intentions).
According to Saxer, who has published a book under the same title, the result is a “wolf world”, meaning a world “in which the law of the strongest triumphs over the might of the lawless.”
middle powers push back
Naturally, most other countries have no interest in such a world. But are counter-trends emerging?
Klein-Brockhoff identifies three specific responses, each depending on a country’s geographical location and strategic environment.
Japan, which is close to China’s rising power and has few like-minded partners in the Asia-Pacific region, has no choice but to try to deepen its cooperation with the US.
According to Klein-Brockhoff, Europe, which forms one geographical unit and is politically interconnected, is focusing on “strengthening itself economically and militarily”. In doing so, he is trying to retain the US as long as possible during the transition phase so that it can eventually stand on its own feet.
The third model – a kind of counter-alliance of middle powers – was expressed by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in his highly praised speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2026.
He said, “The old order will not come back. We should not mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy. But out of this brokenness we can build something better, stronger and more equitable. That is the job of the middle powers.”
German Chancellor Merz made a similar statement in Davos that the old world order was “crumbling.”
Analyst Saxer said it is important to note how non-Western countries are now playing a role in determining the future of the global order.
“What makes this historical juncture so special is that for the first time in centuries, non-Western powers are playing a decisive role in shaping the next world order.” Unlike in the past, “order will no longer mean Westernization,” he said.
The regulatory framework will need to take into account both China’s concept of order – where rules serve the collective rather than the individual – and the beliefs of the Muslim world, which are based on community of believers. However, there are also conflicts within these concepts of the system, such as between Shia and Sunni Islam.
What might the new global order look like?
To thrive in this world, Saxer highlights several aspects that connect the “actions” of Carney, the Canadian leader to the middle powers. This involves cooperation not in the form of an “alliance” but in the form of a “middle-power partnership” to prevent the formation of any faction.
Saxer said, “Given limited capabilities, we cannot rely solely on coalitions of like-minded democracies to address global challenges. Partnerships in the Middle must bring together all solution-oriented states, regardless of their internal political arrangements.”
This pragmatic approach proceeds from value-based politics and the pursuit of like-minded partners.
Partners based on shared interests replace partners based on shared values. Instead of like-minded partners working with or against each other, collaboration occurs in areas where interests align, which can then be hindered where interests diverge.
Of course, this is always done while upholding certain non-negotiable principles such as human rights.
To achieve this vision of a new global order, Saxer envisions a new version of the Cold War-era “Helsinki Declaration”, which primarily addresses security issues in Europe and can be summed up as “sovereignty without interference”.
In the early 1970s, during the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union – with the participation of European NATO member states and Warsaw Pact countries – agreed to a voluntary commitment in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which did not have the status of an international treaty.
According to Saxer, this approach is relevant again today.
DGAP Director Klein-Brockhoff is skeptical about the sustainability of such an arrangement, especially since, unlike in the past, the forces of the global order are currently diminished.
“Each system requires enforcement agencies and a minimum level of regulations and compliance with those regulations,” he said. He said the fluid notion of stakeholders cooperating in areas like climate policy but working against each other in security policy ultimately remains untenable.
On Carney’s worldview, Klein-Brockhoff argues that the middle powers are very different and have very different interests.
“I see opposing forces, but not the relationship between them,” he said.
Bad time for general solutions
As a result, current developments are making it more difficult to preserve global public goods. Mitigating climate change, managing global health risks such as pandemics, and securing peace are becoming increasingly difficult.
Klein-Brockhoff fears the beginning of an era of “endless free-riding”. Instead of working together to address global challenges, individual actors will increasingly seek their own advantage.
To prevent this, Saxer sees no option other than collaboration between stakeholders who are willing to cooperate in a practical way.
In his view, the “transformative realism” he outlines offers the best opportunity to integrate different visions of the system after the end of the liberal order, in order to address specific global challenges without returning to the formation of factions.
This article has been translated from German